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BEATING AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN: WHY
WASHINGTON NEEDS A NEW RULE OF EVIDENCE
ADMITTING PRIOR ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Linell A. Letendre
Abstract: Batterers in Washington who use violence to control their intimate partners
routinely avoid conviction and punishment due to the difficulties of prosecuting domestic
violence cases. Prosecutors often face complex problems, such as recanting victims, lack of
other witnesses, and juries inherently biased against battered women. Although some
Washington prosecutors have found ways to introduce evidence of prior domestic violence in
certain limited circumstances, Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally precludes the
use of evidence showing prior domestic violence. This Comment argues that this evidence
rule prevents the admission of highly probative evidence of prior abuse against current or past
victims that tends to show a defendant's propensity to batter. This Comment proposes that the
Supreme Court of Washington recognize the difficulty in proving domestic violence cases and
adopt a new evidence rule that would admit prior acts of domestic violence for all relevant
purposes-including propensity.
Since at least 1996, Roger' has abused his intimate partners. Ruth,
Meredith, and Nicole all suffered physical abuse at the hands of Roger.
His outbursts varied from beating Ruth's head against a door to
destroying a phone to prevent a bruised and bleeding Nicole from calling
911. Due to Washington's current restrictions on admitting evidence of
prior abuse, Roger was never convicted of his assaults against Ruth or
Meredith. Finally, in December 1999, Roger received 'justice"--he
pleaded guilty to one count of assault against Nicole and served one day
in jail.
In Washington, countless batterers2 avoid conviction or meaningful
sentencing because Washington Rule of Evidence (ER) 404(b) severely
restricts admission of evidence of a defendant's prior domestic violence
Past victims, like Meredith, are not allowed to testify about the
defendant's violence against them even if the batterer claims that the
1. Names of all parties in the introduction have been changed to protect privacy. Court
documents are on file with author.
2. A "batterer" is a person who systematically abuses in order to "coerce the victim to do the will
of the victimizer." Margi Laird McCue, Domestic Violence, A Reference Handbook 3 (1995)
(internal citation omitted). This Comment will use the term "batterer" and "abuser' interchangeably.
3. See Wash. R. Evid. 404(b).
Washington Law Review
current victim was injured by accident.4 For evidence of prior abuse
against the same victim, admissibility varies according to the seriousness
of abuse committed and the type of defense raised.' Because domestic
violence victims often recant their reports of abuse, evidence of past
violence can be critical to the prosecution's case.' Even if the victim does
testify at trial, studies show that without evidence of prior abuse many
jurors are inherently biased against the domestic violence victim and tend
to believe the violence did not occur.7
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of Washington should
establish a new evidence rule authorizing admission of evidence of
defendants' prior acts of domestic violence. This Comment urges
Washington courts to admit evidence of defendants' prior abuse against
both current and past victims and to allow juries to consider these bad
acts to show defendants' propensity8 for violence against intimate
partners. Part I provides an overview of domestic violence dynamics and
explains the problems associated with prosecuting domestic violence
cases. Part II explains the current application of ER 404(b) in
Washington domestic violence cases. Part III provides examples of
changes to evidentiary rules made by courts and legislatures when prior
rules failed to allow admission of probative evidence. Part IV analyzes
the overly restrictive nature of the current Washington law that denies
admission of evidence of prior domestic violence. Finally, Part V argues
that public-policy concerns, judicial consistency, and the importance of
admitting highly probative evidence in criminal cases all support the
adoption of a new evidence rule allowing admission of evidence of any
prior domestic violence to show a defendant's propensity to batter.
4. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part I.B. 1.
7. See infra Part 1.B.2.
8. Propensity is the inclination or predisposition to commit a certain type of crime. See Lisa Marie
De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 359, 388 (1996).
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I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS AND
THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVICTING PERPETRATORS
A. Domestic Violence Dynamics in Intimate Relationships
In order to understand the need for change in evidentiary rules,
one must first comprehend the sheer magnitude of the domestic violence
problem. Domestic violence is an epidemic in American society.9 While
it is difficult to determine the actual number of victims, conservative
estimates reveal an alarming incidence of violence between intimate
partners. ° The real horror of domestic violence, however, lies not in the
numbers, but in the way abuse occurs. Batterers develop a cyclical
pattern of abuse and affection in order to control their victims." This use
of violence as a control mechanism is reflected in the high recidivism
rate among domestic violence perpetrators. 2
1. Domestic Violence and the Cycle of Control
Domestic violence is defined in Washington as "[p]hysical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm,
bodily injury or assault[,] ... sexual assault[,] ... or stalking" by one
family or household member against another. 3 Victims in violent
intimate relationships experience a range of physical abuse from being
slapped, punched, kicked, thrown, or hit with objects to being scalded
with hot liquids, cut, choked, or bitten.'4 Such violent acts result in
injuries ranging from bruises, concussions, or broken bones to
miscarriage, partial loss of sight, and even death. 5
9. See Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecution of Spouse Abuse: Innovations in Criminal Justice Response
14(1981).
10. For purposes of this Comment, intimate partners are non-related adults who meet the
definition of family or household members in Revised Code of Washington (RCW) section
10.99.020 (1998).
11. See Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 55 (1979).
12. See infra part LA.3.
13. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.010(1) (Supp. 1999). The scope of this Comment is limited to
domestic violence between adult intimate partners.
14. See Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage: Until Death Do Us Part, in Violence Between
Intimate Partners: Patterns, Causes and Effects 50 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997).
15. See iE at 52; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 10.99.020 (1998) (identifying crimes of domestic
violence).
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Domestic violence generally cycles through three periods: tension
building, acute battering, and a honeymoon phase.'6 Minor episodes of
violence may occur in the tension-building stage where individuals cope
by avoiding or placating their batterers. 7 In the next phase, explosive or
acute battering incidents occur, which may last from a few minutes to
several days.'" Following such battering, some couples enter a
honeymoon phase where the batterer showers the victim with apologies,
love, and affection, 9 while other couples proceed directly back to a
tension-building stage."
2. Prevalence of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence affects more people than any other health-
care problem in the United States.2' The Department of Justice estimates
that more than 800,000 women22 are assaulted, beaten, or raped by their
intimate partners each year.23 Conservative studies indicate that severe
assaults (including kicking, biting, punching, or assaults with deadly
weapons) occur in 12.6% of relationships while more "routine" violence
(including slapping, shoving, or pushing) occurs in almost 28% of
16. See Walker, supra note 11, at 55.
17. See id. at 56-59.
18. Seeid. at 59-65.
19. See id. at 65-70.
20. See R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, The Nature and Antecedents of Violent Events,
24 Brit. J. Criminology 269, 283 (1984).
21. See Washington State Domestic Violence Task Force, Final Report, at 1 (1991) (hereinafter
Washington Final Report) (citing former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop).
22. Although men are also victims of domestic violence, this Comment will refer to women as
victims and men as batterers because women are victims in 95% of the assaults that result in injury.
See Donald G. Dutton, The Domestic Assault of Women: Psychological and Criminal Justice
Perspectives 45 (1995). Domestic violence is not restricted to heterosexual couples, but occurs in
comparable rates in lesbian and gay couples. See Claire M. Renzetti, Violence and Abuse among
Same-Sex Couples, in Violence Between Intimate Partners: Patterns. Causes and Effects 70, 70
(Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997). This Comment's proposal to admit evidence of past abuse in
domestic violence cases would apply equally to male and female perpetrators.
23. See Lawrence A. Greenfeld et. al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of
Data on Crimes by Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends 3 (1998). One source
estimates that more than 2.1 million women are physically abused by their intimate partners each
year. See Susan L. Miller & Charles F. Wellford, Patterns and Correlates ofInterpersonal Violence,
in Violence Between Intimate Partners: Patterns, Causes and Effects 16, 19 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed.,
1997).
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relationships.24 These figures are even more troubling when considering
that only one in six cases of assault are reported to law enforcement.'
Unfortunately, in some relationships the violence does not stop with
simple assault. In 1996 alone, more than 1300 violent relationships in the
United States resulted in the woman's death.26 Of female murder victims,
30% are killed by their husbands or boyfriends.27 Emergency-room
documentation indicates that 17% of women seeking medical treatment
received injuries as a result of domestic violence.28
3. High Recidivism Rate ofDomestic Violence
Contrary to early theories, violence in an intimate relationship is not
an impulsive action or an outbreak of rage.29 Studies show that abusive
men use violence as a control tool to force their intimate partners to
comply with their demands. 0 Batterers will intentionally plan or seek out
situations in which to use physical force against their partners.3 This
physical violence reinforces the batterer's ability to control his victim.32
Batterers seldom stop at a single violent incident.33 Because physical
violence is an instrument of control, past violent behavior in a
relationship is "the best predictor of future violence." Studies
demonstrate that once violence occurs in a relationship, the use of force
24. See Dutton, supra note 22, at 8 (citing studies). Some researchers believe that physical abuse
occurs in 50% of all marriages at some point in the relationship. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Legal
Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue ofSeparation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1991).
25. See Dutton, supra note 22, at 218; see also Suman Kakar, Domestic Abuse: Public
Policy/Criminal Justice Approaches Towards Chil4 Spousal and Elderly Abuse 38 (1998) (citing
National Crime Survey that 48% of domestic violence assaults go unreported).
26. See Greenfeld et al., supra note 23, at 5.
27. See id.
28. See The Commission on Domestic Violence: Statistics (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://
www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.htrnl> [hereinafter Domestic Violence Commission Web Site] (citing
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Violence-Related Injuries Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments
(NCJ-156921), Aug. 1997, at 5).
29. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 71, 85 (1992).
30. See Jan E. Stets, Domestic Violence and Control 109 (1988).
31. See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 20, at 286.
32. See id.
33. See Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the
Prosecution of Male Batterers, in Domestic Violence on Trial: Psychological and Legal Dimensions
ofFamily Violence 218,222-23 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987).
34. Id at 222.
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will reoccur in 63% of these relationships. 35 Nearly one-third of domestic
violence victims experiencing physical violence have been battered at
least twice in the last six months.36 Even if a batterer moves on to another
relationship, he will continue to use physical force as a means of
controlling his new partner.37 Thus, without intervention by the judicial
system or trained counselors, a batterer's propensity for continued
violence remains high.38
B. Problems in Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases
Despite the increased emphasis in law enforcement on combating
domestic violence,39 as well as increased community activism raising
awareness about the problem,4" conviction rates of batterers remain
incredibly low. For every 100 domestic assaults, only 14 assaults are
reported, 1.5 batterers are arrested, and 0.49 defendants are convicted.4'
The low conviction rate results from numerous problems confronting
prosecutors.42 One Washington state study found that some prosecutors
are reluctant to pursue domestic violence cases because of recanting
victims and the lack of meaningful punishments.43 Even when victims
cooperate fully, prosecutors routinely lack other witnesses or
documented physical evidence." Without corroborating evidence,
domestic violence cases are difficult for the prosecution to win due to
juror biases against domestic violence victims.45
35. See Dutton, supra note 22, at 8-9.
36. See Greenfeld et al., supra note 23, at 15.
37. See Coker, supra note 29, at 84.
38. See Sonkin & Fazio, supra note 33, at 222-23. Twenty-five percent of men in domestic
violence treatment will re-offend while in counseling. See id. at 223; see also Laura Crites & Donna
Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss: A Unique Guide To Custody Decisions When
Spouse Abuse Is Charged, Judges J. 9, 12 (Spring 1988) (recognizing strong potential for
reoccurrence of spousal abuse without counseling).
39. See. e.g., Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 20.
40. See, e.g., id at 9-11.
41. See Dutton, supra note 22, at 233.
42. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 367.
43. See Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 24.
44. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 370-71.
45. See infra part I.B.2.
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1. Recanting Victims
One major problem in prosecuting domestic violence is that a victim
often recants her statement. Experts estimate that in Seattle, Washington,
victims cooperate in only half of charged domestic violence cases."
When a victim refuses to help the prosecution, batterer conviction rates
drop dramatically.47 A victim will frequently express reluctance to assist
the prosecution because she still loves the defendant, is financially
dependent on him, or believes that he will retaliate.48
After reflecting on a report of physical violence, a battered woman
sometimes recants based on her love of her partner. A victim normally
reports physical assaults at the peak of the acute-battering stage.49
Subsequently, however, a couple will often slip into the honeymoon
stage where a batterer reconciles with the victim by showering her with
gifts and promising to change. A victim often will respond not only by
recanting her previous report of abuse but also by working against the
prosecution by cooperating with the public defender, hiring a private
defense attorney, or posting bail for the batterer5 Even if no
reconciliation occurs, a victim will sometimes choose to keep her family
together rather than pursue a domestic violence assault charge. 2
A victim will sometimes recant based on a "rational economic
choice."'3 Due to his need for control, a batterer often manages all the
family finances.' Therefore, in order to leave her abuser, a victim must
walk away from her primary source of income and any family savings. If
46. See Lerman, supra note 9, at 163 tbl.3 (citing statistics from Seattle's Battered Women's
Project). Although Seattle has since stopped collecting statistics on recanting victims, Seattle
prosecutors state that the incidence of recanting victims remains high. Telephone Interview with
Sarah McCauley, Deputy Seattle Prosecuting Attorney (Jan. 7, 2000). See also, De Sanctis, supra
note 8, at 367 (stating that victims refuse to cooperate in 80% to 90% of cases).
47. See Dutton, supra note 22, at 216; see also Lerman, supra note 9, at 18 (citing study that 92%
of dismissals of felony domestic violence cases occur because of victim not cooperating).
48. See Jeffrey Fagan, The Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises and Limits 28-29
(1996).
49. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 369; see also supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
50. See Stuart H. Baggish & Christopher G. Frey, Domestic Physical Abuse: A Proposed Use for
Evidence of Specific Similar Acts in Criminal Prosecutions to Corroborate Victim Testimony, Fla.
B.J. 57, 57 (Oct. 1994).
51. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 369-70.
52. See Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 6-7.
53. De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 369.
54. See Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 6.
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a victim is employed, departing the local area to escape the violent
situation safely may force a victim to give up her job and risk her
children's welfare." Even if a victim can avoid moving and maintain her
job, a batterer can inflict additional economic harm on the victim by
harassing her at work or at home until she is fired or evicted.56 Half of
battered women who choose to leave their abusive partner drop below
the poverty line.1
7
A victim may also recant based on the well-founded fear that her
batterer will retaliate. One study shows that 73% of battered women who
seek medical help received injuries after leaving their abuser. 8 Two-
thirds of those killed by intimate partners were separated from their
batterer prior to their death. 9 Because a batterer knows where the
victim's friends and relatives live' and shelters are routinely filled to
capacity," a victim often has no safe place to hide.
2. Juror Biases
Even if a victim is courageous enough to testify, prosecutors must still
overcome juror bias. Many jurors believe domestic violence is rare in
today's society.62 This "societal denial" is pervasive because most people
want to uphold the institution of marriage and prevent scrutiny of their
own relationships.63 For example, male jurors generally minimize acts of
domestic violence to prevent examination of their own acts.'
Meanwhile, female jurors, who often refuse to believe that they could be
55. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of Batterers
Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. Cal. Rev.
L. & Women's Stud. 219, 245 (1992).
56. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 368- 69. Between 15% and 50% of abused women report that
their abusive partner interferes with their education, training, or work. See Domestic Violence
Commission Web Site, supra note 28.
57. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 368 (citing National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women, Statistics Packet 39-40 (3d ed. Feb. 1994)).
58. See Kakar, supra note 25, at 37; see also De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 368 n.52.
59. See Domestic Violence Commission Web Site, supra note 28.
60. See Bowman, supra note 55, at 244.
61. Between July 1, 1998, and June 30, 1999, Washington domestic violence shelters served
23,555 victims and turned away 23,409 others. Telephone Interview with Susan Hannibal, Program
Manager at Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. (Apr. 27, 2000).
62. See Bowman, supra note 55, at 244.
63. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 14-15.
64. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 372.
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the victim of abuse, avoid classifying the offense as an act of domestic
violence.65 Although the media increasingly portrays acts of domestic
violence in television dramas or films, assaults depicted focus on life-
threatening situations.' Thus, many jurors tend to limit their definition
of domestic violence to deadly assaults as opposed to the typical offenses
of threats, harassment, simple assaults, and violations of restraining
orders.67
Jurors are also biased by their beliefs in myths concerning how
batterers and victims should look and act.68 Jurors generally expect the
batterer and the victim to fit stereotypes of domestic violence
participants-low-income minorities.69 If either the victim or batterer
fails to fit such categories, many jurors will discredit the prosecution's
story.0 However, even if the victim fits the stereotype, jurors will tend to
label her as a perpetual victim who seeks out abuse.7 Many jurors accept
the notion that the victim is partly to blame for the battering because she
is "masochistic." 2 One juror study found that 57% of men and 71% of
women believe the myth that the victim would leave her abuser if she
had really experienced the alleged violence.7 Thus, most jurors are not
inclined to believe the victim's story.
When confronted with conflicting testimony between the victim and
the batterer, jurors are inclined to believe the batterer. First, the
disposition to believe the batterer is bolstered by gender bias or the belief
that women are less credible than men. 4 Studies repeatedly show that
jurors find women to be less rational, less trustworthy, and more likely to
exaggerate than men.7' Jurors' gender bias is frequently reinforced at trial
65. At least one scholar has argued that women jurors may also fear that they could be victims of
domestic violence, therefore these jurors feel the need to distance themselves from the victim and
believe that the victim's behavior is the cause of the violence. See id. at 371-72.
66. See Bowman, supra note 55, at 234.
67. See id.
68. See generally Kakar, supra note 25, at 33-39.
69. See Bowman, supra note 55, at 242. Studies show domestic violence is prevalent throughout
society regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or economic status. See Miller, supra note 23, at 20.
70. See Bowman, supra note 55, at 242.
71. See id (internal quotations omitted).
72. Dutton, supra note 22, at 214 (citing study showing 34% of men and 50% of women believe
battered women enjoy getting beaten).
73. See ld
74. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 373.
75. See d
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because batterers often appear confident, charming, and personable on
the stand.76 Thus, jurors are easily misled to conclude that such a person
could not be the monster charged with domestic assault.77 Second, jurors
are influenced by their "belief in a just world" or the belief that violence
is rare and that if violence does occur, it only happens when there is good
cause.78 As a result of jurors' belief that violence is uncommon, jurors
are inclined to believe the batterer's testimony that the domestic violence
charge is based on a mistake, an accident, or a lie.79 Without evidence to
dispel these biases, jurors are inclined to believe the batterer over the
victim, thereby increasing the difficulty of convicting domestic violence
perpetrators.
II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE UNDER WASHINGTON RULE OF EVIDENCE
404(b)
Although Washington prosecutors have in some circumstances found
ways to introduce evidence of prior domestic violence, the admission of
such evidence is limited in type and purpose by Washington Rule of
Evidence (ER) 404(b). The majority of cases allowing evidence of prior
domestic violence against the same victim involve spousal-murder
charges80 or cases where defendants assert a defense of mistake or
accident.8' Recognizing the difficulties in proving domestic violence
cases, Washington courts have recently begun allowing evidence of prior
abuse to support the victim's credibility.82 Despite increased admission
of evidence pertaining to current victims, evidence of abuse against prior
victims remains extremely difficult to admit under the current appli-
cation of ER 404(b). 3
76. See Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 5.
77. See id.
78. Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change,
100 Yale L.J. 1731, 1737 (1991). Such a belief causes people to believe that "everyone gets what
they deserve and deserves what they get." Id.
79. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 371.
80. See State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 259, 893 P.2d 615, 624 (1995) (citing cases).
81. See, e.g., State v. Gogolin, 45 Wash. App. 640, 646, 727 P.2d 683, 686-87 (1986). Such a
defense claims that the victim sustained injuries as a result of an unintentional act by the defendant
or through some unusual or unexpected mishap. See Black's Law Dictionary 15, 1001 (6th ed.
1990).
82. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Under current Washington law, evidence of past crimes or bad acts
cannot be admitted to show a defendant's propensity to commit the crime
charged." The rationale behind restricting propensity evidence is that its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value." Evidence
has a prejudicial effect if it tends to entice jurors to decide the merits of
the case on an impermissible basis,86 while evidence has probative value
if it increases the probability of the existence of a material fact in the
case.87 In general, prior bad acts have low probative value as to whether a
defendant committed the crime charged because little correlation exists
between a person's disposition and conduct at a particular time. 8 In
contrast, the prejudicial effect of admitting prior bad acts remains high
because jurors tend to accord such evidence too much weight in relation
to other evidence presented at trial. 9 The prejudicial effect of prior
misconduct may also cause jurors to penalize a defendant for his or her
past acts instead of focusing on whether the current charge occurred.9"
Despite these concerns, every jurisdiction in the United States,
including Washington, has recognized that in some situations the
probative value of prior bad acts is sufficient to warrant its admission."
For example, courts will admit prior bad acts under the doctrine of
chances.92 Under this theory, prior misconduct becomes sufficiently
probative when used to dispute a defendant's claim of mistake or
accident when the repetition of such acts can no longer be seen as
coincidental.93 Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b) appears to accept
84. See Wash. R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."); accord Powell,
126 Wash. 2d at 258, 893 P.2d at 624.
85. See Wash. R. Evid. 403.
86. See Edward 3. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 8.23 (1996).
87. See id. § 8.01.
88. See id. § 2.18.
89. See id. §1.03.
90. See id.
91. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, Comment, The Presumption ofInnocence Imperiled: The New Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 Wash.
L. Rev. 883, 887 (1995).
92. See Eric D. Lansverk, Comment, Admission of Evidence of Other Misconduct in Washington
to Prove Intent or Absence of Mistake or Accident: The Logical Inconsistencies of Evidence Rule
404(b), 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1213, 1227 (1986).
93. See i. at 1225-26.
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the doctrine of chances by authorizing the admission of evidence of past
bad acts to prove identity or absence of mistake or accident.' In addition,
ER 404(b) permits the admission of evidence of past bad acts to show
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, [or] knowledge."'95
Although most trial courts rely on the enumerated categories in ER
404(b), courts have discretion to admit other evidence of past bad acts if
the probative value outweighs the prejudice to the defendant.96
When determining whether ER 404(b) applies to particular evidence, a
trial court applies a four-part test.97 First, a court identifies the purpose
for admitting the prior misconduct (for example to show motive or
absence of accident). 9 Second, a court decides whether the evidence is
relevant to prove an element of the offense charged.99 Third, a court
balances the probative value of the evidence with its prejudicial effect by
applying the test articulated by Washington Rule of Evidence 403."°°
Finally, the prosecution must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the bad act occurred.'' Once a court rules on the
admissibility of prior-misconduct evidence, only the defendant may
appeal the ruling.0 2 On appeal, the evidentiary determination by the trial
court in admitting prior misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion.'0
3
B. Admissibility of Evidence of Past Domestic Violence Against the
Same Victim Under Current Washington Law
While Washington courts hearing spousal-murder cases have admitted
evidence of past violence since 1914,"° the Supreme Court of
Washington first fully explored the admission of prior domestic violence
94. See Wash. R Evid. 404(b).
95. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b).
96. See State v. Lane, 125 Wash. 2d 825, 831, 889 P.2d 929, 932 (1995).
97. See State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 853, 889 P.2d 487, 490 (1995).
98. See id.
99. See id. Evidence is relevant if the "purpose of admitting the evidence is of consequence to the
action and makes the existence of the identified fact more probable." State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d
244, 259, 893 P.2d 615, 624 (1995).
100. See Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 853, 889 P.2d at 490; see also Wash. 1. Evid. 403.
101. See Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 853, 889 P.2d at 490.
102. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.10.010 (1998); State v. Rear, 5 Wash. 2d 534, 537-38, 105 P.2d
827, 828 (1940).
103. See Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 258, 893 P.2d at 624.
104. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 80 Wash. 532, 534-35, 141 P. 1025, 1025-26 (1914).
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evidence in State v. Powell."0 After enduring months of beatings,
attempted strangulations, and threats, Carrie Powell left her husband."6
Two days later, Carrie's husband strangled her, crushed her skull into
fragments, and threw her body off the Deception Pass Bridge. 7 The trial
court admitted evidence of prior abuse under ER 404(b) for the purposes
of showing motive, °8 intent, ' 9 and opportunity.10 On review, the
supreme court upheld the admission of prior-misconduct evidence for
showing motive and res gestae"' but found the trial court erroneously
admitted evidence under the ER 404(b) categories of intent and
opportunity."
2
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the admission of prior
assaults under ER 404(b) to demonstrate motive."3 Specifically, the
court upheld the admissibility of eyewitness testimony describing the
defendant beating Carrie on prior occasions and testimony that Carrie
attempted to divorce her husband but later dropped the action." 4 The
court also affirmed the admission of a friend's testimony that, after
seeing bruises and red marks on Carrie's neck, Carrie had acknowledged
that her husband tried to strangle her."5 The court found this evidence of
prior misconduct probative to demonstrate the defendant's motive." 6
Prior to admission, however, the court required that the evidence have a
specific purpose to warrant its admission." 7 The court ruled that, because
105. 126 Wash. 2d 244,893 P.2d 615 (1995).
106. See iaL at 247,249-51,893 P.2d at 618-20.
107. See i&
108. Motive is the "impulse, desire, or any other moving power which causes an individual to
act." lad at 259, 893 P.2d at 624.
109. Intent is the "[d]esign, resolve or determination with which [a] person acts." Black's Law
Dictionary, supra note 81, at 810.
110. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 253, 893 P.2d at 621. Opportunity evidence "demonstrates the
ability of a defendant to do a wrong because of a favorable combination of circumstances, time, and
place that serves to identify the defendant." Id. at 262-63, 893 P.2d at 626.
111. Res gestae evidence includes the actions or occurrences so closely connected to an event that
they are essentially part ofthe event. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 81, at 1305.
112. See Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 264, 893 P.2d at 626 -27.
113. See i. at 260, 893 P.2d at 625.
114. See id. at 249-50, 893 P.2d at 618-19.
115. See ka at 250-51, 893 P.2d at 619-20.
116. See Ua at 260-61, 893 P.2d at 625.
117. See ia at 260, 893 P.2d at 625.
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"only circumstantial proof of guilt exist[ed]" against the defendant,
evidence of prior abuse was admissible to show motive." 8
The court also affirmed the admission of prior misconduct under res
gestae."' Although not a specific exception under ER 404(b), 21 res
gestae allows admission of prior-misconduct evidence to "'complete the
story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of
happenings near in time and place." 2'1 In Powell, the court affirmed the
admission of evidence detailing the last two days of Carrie's life to
establish the violence between Carrie and her husband prior to her
death. 22 Using res gestae, the court upheld testimony that the day of
Carrie's death the defendant was drinking and becoming violent, Carrie
wanted to call the police, and the defendant expressed outrage when he
discovered Carrie had taken money from their joint bank account.' 23
The Supreme Court of Washington, however, overruled the trial
court's decision to allow evidence of prior bad acts to show intent and
opportunity under ER 404(b). 24 Although the evidence of prior
misconduct was probative of the defendant's intent, the court required
that such evidence be necessary to prove a material issue. 25 The court
found that proof of manual strangulation established intent to kill, and
thus evidence of prior beatings was inadmissible to show intent. 26 In
addition, the court held that none of the evidence of prior bad acts
established the defendant's opportunity to murder Carrie. 127 Opportunity
evidence is admissible only if the time, place, and circumstances
surrounding the act demonstrate the defendant's ability to have
accomplished the alleged act. 28 The trial court's erroneous admission of
evidence under the ER 404(b) exceptions of intent and opportunity did
not require reversal of the defendant's conviction because the court
118. Seeid.
119. See id. 263, 893 P.2d at 626.
120. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
121. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 263, 893 P.2d at 626 (quoting State v. Tharp, 27 Wash. App. 198,
204, 616 P.2d 693, 697 (1980)).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 250, 893 P.2d at 619.
124. See id. at 261-63, 893 P.2d at 625-26.
125. See id. at 262, 893 P.2d at 626.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 262-63, 893 P.2d at 626.
128. See id.
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upheld the admission of prior-misconduct evidence to show motive and
res gestae.
129
Since Powell, other Washington courts have admitted evidence of
prior abuse against the same victim using ER 404(b) criteria such as
motive, res gestae, and absence of accident. The Supreme Court of
Washington upheld the admission of evidence of prior quarrels to
demonstrate motive in State v. Stenson.3" This evidence included
testimony that the defendant allowed his wife to leave the house only
once a day and that the defendant displayed controlling and antagonistic
behavior during a quarrel with his wife.' Washington courts have also
allowed evidence of prior verbal abuse and threats in order to
demonstrate res gestae in domestic violence cases of felony
harassment'3 2 and rape.' Finally, Washington courts have admitted
evidence of past domestic assaults when the defendant raises an accident
defense. 34 In State v. Gogolin,"3' the court upheld the admission of
evidence showing a history of abuse and hostility in the defendant's
conduct toward his ex-wife in order to rebut the defendant's claim that
his ex-wife received her head wounds from falling down stairs.136
Some Washington appellate courts have also gone beyond the
exceptions listed in ER 404(b) and admitted evidence of past abuse to
support a domestic violence victim's credibility. A victim's testimony in
court may directly contradict her prior actions or statements because a
domestic violence victim often complies with her batterer's demands in
order to prevent violence and thus minimizes her description of physical
abuse.'37 In State v. Grant,'38 the court allowed evidence of prior assaults
by the defendant to explain why his wife talked with him despite a no-
contact order and why she initially refused to identify the defendant as
129. See id. 264, 893 P.2d at 626.
130. 132 Wash. 2d 668, 702-03, 940 P.2d 1239, 1257 (1997).
131. See id at 698-701,940 P.2d at 1255-56.
132. See, e.g., State v. Pressnell, No. 20092-9-1, 1997 WL 273632, at *1-3 (Wash. Ct. App. May
23, 1997).
133. See, e.g., State v. Mills, No. 41992-7-1, 1999 WL 294102, at *1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. May 10,
1999), review denied, 139 Wash. 2d 1009, 994 P.2d 846.
134. See, e.g., State v. Gogolin, 45 Wash. App. 640, 646,727 P.2d 683, 687 (1986).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 646,727 P.2d at 686-87.
137. See State v. Grant, 83 Wash. App. 98, 107, 920 P.2d 609, 613 (1996).
138. 83 Wash. App. 98, 920 P.2d 609 (1996).
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her attacker.139 The court reasoned that evidence of prior domestic
violence helps explain the victim's prior inconsistent statements and
conduct that the jury might otherwise weigh against her credibility.' 4
Appellate courts have also allowed evidence of past assaults when, at
trial, the victim disclaims any physical abuse by the defendant.'4 ' In State
v. Woods, 42 the court upheld admission of a 911 call by the victim, after
a previous assault by the defendant, in order to show the credibility of the
recanting victim.'43
C. Admissibility of Evidence of Past Domestic Violence Against a
Prior Victim Under Current Washington Law
Although Washington appellate courts have become more liberal in
upholding the admission of prior abuse evidence involving the same
victim, courts rarely admit evidence of prior bad acts against other
victims. Washington courts normally admit evidence of crimes against
other victims only when it demonstrates a common scheme.'" A
common scheme consists of a plan repeatedly used by the defendant to
commit separate but very similar crimes. "' The Supreme Court of
Washington held in State v. Lough"4 that common-scheme evidence is
admissible under ER 404(b) only when the defendant's prior bad acts
bear significant similarity to the defendant's alleged actions in the
charged crime such that the "similarity is not merely coincidental, but
indicates that the conduct was directed by design."'147 In Lough, the court
139. See id. at 101, 106-07, 920 P.2d at 610-11, 613-14.
140. See id. at 106-07, 920 P.2d at 613-14; see also State v. Wilson, 60 Wash. App. 887, 890-
91, 808 P.2d 754, 756-57 (1991); State v. Norby, No. 37543-1-I, 1997 WL 79484, at *1 (Wash. Ct.
App. Feb. 24, 1997) (allowing evidence of prior violence and abuse to demonstrate reasonableness
of victim's fear as element of felony harassment).
141. See, e.g., State v. Bernal, No. 41022-9-, 1999 WL 10094, at *1, *4 (Wash. CL App. Jan. 11,
1997).
142. No. 42197-2-1, 1999 WL 307246 (Wash. Ct. App. May 17, 1999).
143. See id. at *3.
144. See, e.g., State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 855, 889 P.2d 487, 491 (1995). But see State v.
Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 573-75, 940 P.2d 546, 570-71 (1997) (allowing evidence of attempted
murder, false imprisonment, torture, and rape of another victim when defendant murdered victim in
same manner for purposes of demonstrating premeditation, intent, and res gestae).
145. See Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 855, 889 P.2d 487, 491 (1995). Common-scheme evidence is
also permitted to show several crimes committed to achieve a larger plan. See id.
146. 125 Wash. 2d 847, 889 P.2d 487 (1995).
147. Id. at 860, 889 P.2d at 494.
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allowed testimony from four other victims that the defendant, a
paramedic, drugged their drinks with a particular chemical and then
anally raped them. 4 Domestic violence fact patterns rarely, if ever, meet
the similarity requirements necessary for admission under ER 404(b)'s
common-scheme or plan exception because the type of abuse and
surrounding circumstances vary considerably.1 49 As a result, ER 404(b)
routinely restricts the admission of probative evidence of past domestic
violence against other victims.
III. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES HAVE MODIFIED
EVIDENTIARY RULES WHEN PROBATIVE EVIDENCE IS
INADMISSIBLE UNDER PRIOR LAW
Outside of domestic violence cases, both Washington courts and the
state legislature have established specific evidentiary exceptions when
confronted with evidence that possesses the requisite probative value for
admissibility but is nonetheless excluded by current evidence rules. The
courts and legislature establish evidentiary exceptions most often for
crimes bearing unique characteristics, such as lack of witnesses or high
recidivism rates. For example, Washington courts have recognized a
non-enumerated ER 404(b) category to allow evidence of lustful
disposition in sexual assault cases,"' and the Washington Legislature has
enacted a special hearsay exception for child abuse cases.' 51 Within the
domestic violence context, other jurisdictions have recognized prior acts
of domestic violence as a category needing distinct treatment and
therefore have established a separate evidence rule authorizing its
admission.'
148. See &L at 850-51, 889 P.2d at 489; see also State v. Roth, 75 Wash. App. 808, 822, 881 P.2d
268, 277 (1994) (allowing evidence of prior wife's allegedly accidental death while hiking to
demonstrate common scheme in spousal-murder and life-insurance fraud case after defendant's
fourth wife drowned while rafting).
149. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
150. Evidence of lustful disposition includes any prior misconduct by the defendant
demonstrating a lustful inclination or sexual desire toward the victim. See State v. Ferguson, 100
Wash. 2d 131, 133-34, 667 P.2d 68, 71 (1983).
151. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.120 (1998).
152. See infra Part lll.C.
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A. Washington Courts Have Expanded ER 404(b) to Allow Prior
Misconduct in Sexual Assault Cases
Washington courts have established a non-enumerated exception to
ER 404(b) for "lustful disposition" evidence in sexual assault cases
because such evidence categorically bears sufficient reliability and
probative value to outweigh any unfair prejudice to a defendant.'
Washington courts use this exception to admit evidence of past sexual
misconduct to show a defendant's lustful inclination or sexual desire
toward the victim.15 4 For example, in State v. Ray,' the court held that
testimony by the defendant's daughter about three prior sexual contacts
was admissible in the current incest charge to show the father's sexual
desire toward his daughter. 6 Unlike the admission of prior acts of
domestic violence, lustful-disposition evidence is allowed for propensity
to show that the charged offense is more probable because the defendant
displayed a past lustful inclination toward the victim. 7
Washington's lustful-disposition exception is essentially a narrower
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 413,58 which governs the
admissibility of prior bad acts in sexual assault cases."' Like
Washington's lustful-disposition exception, the federal rule allows
evidence of a defendant's prior sexual offenses against the same victim
to be used by a jury for "any matter to which it is relevant" including to
prove the defendant's propensity to commit the crime."6 Federal Rule of
Evidence 413 also allows lustful-disposition evidence related to other
victims. 6' Propensity evidence is important in sexual assault cases
because sexual abusers are often repeat offenders and because prior-
misconduct evidence helps jurors evaluate conflicting statements from a
153. The lustful-disposition exception is the "most commonly cited non-enumerated category."
Robert H. Aronson, The Law of Evidence in Washington 404-25 (3d ed. 1998).
154. See Ferguson, 100 Wash. 2d at 133-34, 667 P.2d at 71; see also State v. Thorne, 43 Wash.
2d 47, 60-61,260 P.2d 331, 338-39 (1953).
155. 116 Wash. 2d 531,806 P.2d 1220 (1991).
156. See id. at 546-47, 806 P.2d at 1229-30.
157. See Ferguson, 100 Wash. 2d at 134, 667 P.2d at 71; see also Thorne, 43 Wash. 2d at 61, 260
P.2d at 339.
158. Fed. R. Evid. 413.
159. See Pickett, supra note 91, at 888-90.
160. Fed. R. Evid. 413.
161. Fed. R. Evid. 413.
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victim and defendant. 62 Domestic violence crimes also possess these
distinctive characteristics because domestic violence has a high
recidivism rate 63 and jurors routinely face inconsistencies between the
victim's and defendant's testimonies.'64
B. The Washington Legislature Changed the Evidence Rules to Allow
Hearsay in Child Abuse Cases
The Washington Legislature also has modified evidence law to allow
admission of probative evidence in child abuse cases. Through the
passage of Revised Code of Washington (RCW) section 9A.44.120, the
legislature declared that certain statements by children concerning sexual
or physical abuse should be admissible at trial. 6 As in domestic violence
cases, child abuse cases often have little corroborating evidence of the
crime other than the victim's statements. 66 Prior to enactment of the
child hearsay rule, Washington courts had "strained [the] interpretation
of the excited utterance exception' 67 by admitting children's statements
made as long as twenty hours after the stressful event. 68 Thus, the
passage of this hearsay exception was vital to preventing further
distortion of the excited-utterance hearsay exception and establishing
guidelines by which courts could admit abused children's probative
statements. 169
162. See 140 Cong. Rec. 23, 602-03 (1994) (statement ofRep. Molinari).
163. See supra part LA.3.
164. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
165. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.120 (1998); SSB 4461, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1982)
(describing rationale for adoption of child-hearsay statute).
166. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 15,20-21 (1994).
167. State v. Ramirez, 46 Wash. App. 223, 230, 730 P.2d 98, 102 (1986) (citing State v. Wood-
ward, 32 Wash. App. 204,206-07, 646 P.2d 135, 137 (1982)). Excited utterances are admissible ifa
declarant makes a statement about a startling event while still under the "stress of excitement."
Wash. R. Evid. 803(a)(2).
168. See Ramirez, 46 Wash. App. at 230,730 P.2d at 102.
169. See id at 230-31, 730 P.2d at 102; Sheryl K. Peterson, Comment, Sexual Abuse of
Children-Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 813, 817-18 (1983).
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C. Other Jurisdictions Have Changed Evidence Rules to Admit
Evidence of Prior Domestic Violence
Some states have enacted specific rules of to allow the admission of
prior domestic violence evidence based on the probative nature of such
evidence. Acknowledging the cyclical nature of domestic violence and
its high recidivism rate, both Colorado and Minnesota authorize
admission of evidence of past domestic abuse between the victim and
defendant. 70 The California legislature has gone even further by enacting
California Evidence Code section 1109, which authorizes the admission
of evidence of prior domestic violence against the same or other victims
to show propensity. 7 ' In passing section 1109, the California legislature
found that the probative value of past domestic violence outweighed the
rationale normally forbidding propensity evidence'72 and thereby estab-
lished a presumption that evidence of prior domestic abuse is probative
in domestic violence cases.'73 This presumption is balanced with two
safeguards: the judge's discretion to refuse admission if the prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative value of the evidence and a ten-year time
limit on the admissibility of prior bad acts. 74
Since the passage of section 1109, California courts have permitted
juries to infer that the defendant had the disposition to commit domestic
violence based on past incidents of battery. In People v. Hoover,'75 the
California Court of Appeal held that evidence of prior beatings was
admissible for the purpose of showing propensity and that such an
admission did not violate the defendant's due process rights.'7 6 In
addition to allowing evidence for purposes of propensity, section 1109
allows other victims to testify to the defendant's prior domestic assaults
on them. 177 In People v. Poplar,o7 1 the California Court of Appeal upheld
the testimony of two of the defendant's prior girlfriends describing his
170. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-801.5 (West 1999); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 634.20 (West Supp.
2000).
171. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 (West Supp. 2000).
172. See S.B. 1876, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. June 28, 1996)
173. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1109.
174. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1109.
175. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
176. See id. 210-11 (upholding admission of prior bad acts to show propensity under section
1109 where defendant choked and threatened to kill victim).
177. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1109(a).
178. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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physical assaults on them to demonstrate the defendant's disposition of
violence toward his domestic partners.'79 Unlike Washington courts, the
California court admitted evidence of domestic violence from prior
victims under a specific domestic violence evidence rule and did not
require proof of a common scheme or plan. 8°
IV. WASHINGTON LAW UNDULY RESTRICTS ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In numerous types of cases, ER 404(b) forbids admission of probative
evidence of prior domestic violence. Because prosecutors cannot appeal
a trial court's ruling denying admission of evidence of prior domestic
violence,'' appellate decisions upholding the admission of evidence of
prior domestic violence do not sufficiently represent ER 404(b)'s
inadequacies. Four problems exist with the current admissibility
standards of ER 404(b): (1) admission of evidence depends on the
victim's type of injury, (2) the prosecution can rarely enter prior bad acts
during its case in chief, (3) admission of evidence depends on the
defense presented, and (4) evidence of prior domestic violence against
past victims is inadmissible.
First, ER 404(b)'s admissibility standards for evidence of prior
domestic violence vary depending on the victim's type of injury.
Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b) restricts prior-misconduct evidence
for purposes of showing intent more often in cases of brutal, rather than
less heinous, domestic violence crimes because evidence of past bad acts
is inadmissible to show intent if the act is so violent that intent is clear.'
Thus, as in State v. Powell, where the defendant strangled the victim and
bashed her skull into pieces, 83 the more physically violent the assault,
the less probative the evidence becomes for purposes of intent. A similar
restriction on admissibility of prior bad acts occurs in general-intent
crimes."s Because general-intent crimes do not require the prosecution to
prove that the defendant intended the exact harm or result that
179. See id at 326.
180. See ka at324-25.
181. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
182. See State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 262, 893 P.2d 615, 626 (1995); De Sanctis, supra
note 8, at 376-77.
183. See Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 247, 893 P.2d at 618.
184. "General intent" is the intent to violate the law. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 8 1,
at810.
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occurred, 185 evidence of prior misconduct is not admissible under ER
404(b) to show intent.'86 With the majority of domestic violence charges
being simple-assault or general-intent misdemeanors, 87 this eliminates
the ability to admit prior bad acts under ER 404(b) to show intent in most
domestic violence cases, 188 even though such cases often lack witnesses
or documented evidence.'89
Second, ER 404(b) inhibits the ability of prosecutors to admit prior
bad acts in their case in chief. Prosecutors prefer to introduce prior bad
acts in their opening statements to facilitate the jury's comprehension of
the state's theory. 9 ° In domestic violence cases, however, ER 404(b)
provides only a few exceptions, such as motive and intent, that allow the
prosecutor to admit evidence regardless of the type of defense
presented. 9' If a prosecutor is unable to meet the requirements of ER
404(b), the court will not admit evidence of prior bad acts in the
prosecutor's case in chief because the only remaining purpose of such
evidence would be to show propensity, not currently permitted under ER
404(b) except for lustful disposition.'92
Third, the prosecutor's ability to admit evidence of prior domestic
abuse under ER 404(b) is constrained by the type of defense presented. If
a defendant claims that the injury was an accident or resulted from self-
defense, the prosecution must prove enough similarity between the
charged offense and the prior misconduct such that the similarity shows
the victim's injuries resulted from an intentional act.'93 In contrast, if the
defendant denies that he was the perpetrator, the prosecution must meet
the much higher admissibility standard of identity under ER 404(b) prior
to admission of prior acts of domestic violence. Washington courts
185. See id.
186. See Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 262, 893 P.2d at 626 (requiring prior-misconduct evidence be
necessary to prove element of charge in order to admit such evidence).
187. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 396. In Washington, simple assault or assault in the fourth
degree requires no showing of intent. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.041 (1998).
188. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 396.
189. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
190. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and
Beyond, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1463, 1494 (1996).
191. See id. at 1495; interview with Cathy Shaffer, Senior Deputy King County Prosecuting
Attorney, in Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 5, 1999) (stating that prior bad-act evidence is rarely allowed in
prosecutor's case in chief).
192. See Wash. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615, 624
(1995).
193. See State v. Gogolin, 45 Wash. App. 640, 646, 727 P.2d 683, 686-87 (1986).
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require identity evidence to be "so unusual and distinctive as to be like a
signature."'" Because domestic violence can range from the killing of a
favorite pet to shoving a victim into a wall, 95 evidence of past domestic
violence is unlikely to meet the admissibility standards for identity
evidence. Alternatively, in a case lacking physical evidence and relying
on the victim's testimony, the defendant could deny that the beating
actually took place.'96 By not raising a defense of accident or identity, the
defense could restrict the prosecution from admitting any evidence of
prior domestic violence because the sole purpose of admitting such
evidence would be to prove propensity, which is currently disallowed
under ER 404(b). 97
Fourth, prior acts of domestic violence against other victims rarely, if
ever, meet ER 404(b)'s standard for common scheme or plan because
courts limit common-scheme evidence to testimony demonstrating an
overarching plan or scheme based on "unusual and abnormal elements"
or a "repetition of complex common features."'98 Despite being victim to
the same abuse and control tactics by the defendant, domestic violence
victims' experiences often differ in both the type of offense (for example
verbal harassment versus physical attack) and triggering event (for
example ending the relationship versus talking with a male coworker).' 99
Even though this evidence seldom meets the common-scheme or plan
admissibility requirements," ° prior-victim evidence is often necessary to
convict a batterer. Unlike current victims, past victims may be more
willing to testify because they are no longer subject to the domestic
violence cycle.2"' Furthermore, an additional victim may force jurors to
194. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668, 672 (1984).
195. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 395.
196. Interview with Kristin Chandler & Jim Ferrell, Deputy King County Prosecuting Attorneys,
in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 13, 1999) (describing ways defendants can get around ER 404(b)).
197. See Powell, 126 Wash. 2d at 258, 893 P.2d at 624; see also Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash. 2d
206, 221, 867 P.2d 610, 619 (1994).
198. State v. Burkins, 94 Wash. App. 677, 689,973 P.2d 15,23 (1999); see also supra Part II.C.
199. See DeSanctis, supra note 8, at 395-96.
200. The fact that no Washington appellate court has ruled on the admissibility of other victims'
testimony in a domestic violence case strongly suggests that no lower court has ever admitted such
testimony. Telephone interview with Jim Senescu, Deputy Clark County Prosecuting Attorney (Dec.
23, 1999) (stating that judges have never admitted such evidence in his cases); see also De Sanctis,
supra note 8, at 395-96.
201. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 397.
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reevaluate their biases and to give proper weight to the current victim's
202testimony.
In domestic violence cases, ER 404(b) overly restricts the admission
of evidence of prior abuse. The admissibility standard for evidence of
prior domestic violence varies dramatically depending on the type of
injury received, who received the abuse, and the type of defense
presented. A new rule authorizing the admission of evidence of prior
domestic violence is needed to correct these variances and enable the
jury to consider probative evidence of a defendant's prior abusive
behavior.
V. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT A RULE AUTHORIZING
THE ADMISSION OF PRIOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court of Washington should adopt a rule of evidence,
distinct from ER 404(b), specifically authorizing admission of evidence
of prior domestic violence by a defendant against the same victim or
other intimate partners. This evidence rule should apply in prosecutions
of any domestic violence offense as defined in RCW section 10.99.020.
Admissible evidence of prior misconduct should include any act between
intimate adult partners meeting Washington's definition of domestic
violence in RCW section 26.50.010(l).3 As with ER 404(b) evidence,
the prosecution first should be required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the prior acts of domestic violence occurred.2" This
rule should not restrict a jury's consideration of the evidence to those
enumerated categories in ER 404(b) but instead should enable a jury to
consider such evidence for any relevant purpose including propensity.
This proposed rule also should include safeguards to ensure a fair trial
for the defendant and to guard against the historical concerns of
admitting past misconduct."5 First, this new evidence rule for domestic
violence should maintain a judge's ability to limit or exclude evidence if
its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value in
accordance with ER 403.206 Second, the prosecution should be required
202. See supra Part I.B.2.
203. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
204. See State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 853, 889 P.2d 487, 490 (1995).
205. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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to disclose to a defendant with adequate notice prior to trial both the
intended use of such evidence and any witness statements or physical
evidence concerning the prior bad act.2" 7 Finally, to ensure the probative
nature of the prior bad acts, admission of evidence should be limited to
those acts occurring within a specific time period, such as ten years.
Washington should follow California's lead and adopt a rule
governing the admissibility of prior domestic violence evidence for three
reasons. First, the repetitive nature of these crimes combined with the
need to counteract jurors' traditional biases against battered victims
justifies a specific evidentiary rule. Second, specific authorization of this
evidence is essential to maintaining judicial consistency in domestic
violence cases. Finally, a rule specifically allowing the admission of
prior domestic violence will help deter future acts of violence between
intimate partners.
A. Prior Acts ofDomestic Violence Are Sufficiently Probative to
Warrant a Separate Evidentiary Rule
The highly probative nature of evidence of prior domestic violence
warrants specific authorization for its admission. In enacting Federal
Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 for sexual assault and child molestation,
Congress reasoned that a change in the evidence rules was necessitated
by the distinctive characteristics of those types of cases-namely, the
difficult credibility determinations in such cases and the disposition of
defendants to repeat certain crimes.0 8 Even critics of these Federal Rules
have recognized the value of permitting other victims to corroborate a
victim's version of a crime, of limiting jurors' tendency to blame
victims, and of encouraging the reporting of such crimes."' The policy
arguments that persuaded Congress to alter the Federal Rules of
Evidence regarding prior acts of sexual assault and child-molestation
offenses apply equally to domestic violence cases. First, the high
recidivism rate among batterers2t0 makes prior acts of domestic violence
probative of a defendant's propensity to have committed the current
207. See Raeder, supra note 190, at 1493.
208. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
209. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Mark A. She%
Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 57, 69-70
(1995)).
210. See supra Part IA.3.
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charged offense. Second, jurors need evidence showing prior acts of
misconduct to evaluate properly a victim's credibility and to eliminate
any biases about domestic violence.
1. Evidence of Prior Domestic Violence Is Probative in Showing a
Batterer's Propensity to Have Committed the Charged Crime
Jurors should be permitted to consider prior acts of domestic violence
for propensity purposes.211 Although prior bad acts are usually not
admissible to show propensity because of the prejudicial nature of the
evidence, Washington courts have admitted propensity evidence in
sexual offense crimes,212 which bear many similarities to domestic
violence."' Specifically, courts have allowed evidence of a defendant's
prior lustful disposition toward the same victim for the purpose of
showing that the charged offense more probably occurred.1 4 By adopting
the lustful-disposition exception, Washington courts have recognized
that, in sexual offense cases, certain evidence should be admissible to
show propensity because its probative value sufficiently outweighs its
prejudicial effect.21
Like lustful-disposition evidence, prior acts of domestic violence are
sufficiently probative to outweigh the prejudicial effect of such evidence.
Evidence of prior domestic violence is more probative for showing that a
defendant committed the crime than lustful-disposition evidence because
the recidivism rate of domestic violence batterers is higher than that of
sexual abuse offenders. The American Medical Association found that
47% of batterers who beat their intimate partners do so at least three
times a year,2t6 while the recidivism rate for sexual offenders is only
7.7% within three years.217 Past domestic violence evidence is also
relevant in helping a jury understand that domestic violence is a tool used
by batterers to control their victims and not an impulsive act.218 If a
defendant has used violence as a means to control his victim, these prior
211. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 388-90.
212. See Aronson, supra note 153, at 404-25.
213. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
214. State v. Ferguson, 100 Wash. 2d 131, 134, 667 P.2d 68, 71 (1983).
215. See Aronson, supra note 153, at 404-25.
216. See Domestic Violence Commission Web Site, supra note 28.
217. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 529, 572 (1994).
218. See supra Part I.A.3.
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acts demonstrate a propensity to batter, thereby making it more probable
that the charged abuse occurred.
2. Evidence ofPrior Domestic Violence Is Necessary to Help Jurors
Properly Evaluate Victim Credibility and to Eliminate Juror Bias
Allowing evidence of prior bad acts will help alleviate the difficult
credibility problems in domestic violence cases. Like victims of sexual
assault and child molestation, domestic violence victims are normally the
only witnesses to the crime, thereby making the victim's credibility
central to a prosecutor's case.2 19 With domestic violence crimes, how-
ever, a victim is often unwilling to testify for the prosecution and often
recants her prior statements about physical abuse." A new evidence rule
would help the jury understand a victim's behavior if she recants due to
emotional, economic, or physical perils."2
If the victim does testify for the prosecution, admission of prior acts
will help dislodge juror biases against battered women.2" Without
corroborating evidence of prior abuse, most jurors are skewed against
believing a victim's testimony based on their beliefs that violence is rare
and their acceptance of common domestic violence myths.' Contrary to
critics' arguments that evidence of prior bad acts will improperly sway
the jury, 4 the admission of prior abuse will simply help dispel inherent
juror biases and help jurors view evidence from an unbiased perspective.
The doctrine of chances' also supports the establishment of a
separate domestic violence exception to assist jurors in their evaluation
of victims' and defendants' testimonies. Currently, a jury is not allowed
to hear evidence of prior beatings by the same defendant against a
different intimate victim.226 If faced with a victim claiming abuse and a
defendant claiming that he has been falsely accused or that an accident
219. See Baggish, supra note 50, at 58.
220. See supra Part I.B.1.
221. See supra Part LB.1.
222. See supra Part LB.2.
223. See supra Part LB.2.
224. See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going To Arraign His Whole
Life?". How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1,
11-12(1996).
225. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
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caused the injury, many jurors are biased toward believing the batterer. 7
Under the doctrine of chances, once the repetition of abuse against the
same or similar victims can no longer be viewed as coincidental, jurors
can use such evidence to refute a defense of accident or mistake." Thus,
evidence of prior bad acts is relevant to the jury's evaluation of
conflicting testimony based on this anti-coincidence or doctrine-of-
229chances argument.
B. A New Domestic Violence Evidence Rule Will Help Maintain
Judicial Integrity and Economy
Three judicial policy concerns highlight a need for the court to adopt a
new rule specifically authorizing the admission of evidence of prior
domestic violence. First, with more attention being focused on reforming
the justice system's approach to domestic violence,' ° some courts have
searched for new ways to admit prior acts of domestic violence." In the
quest to reform the judiciary's approach to domestic violence, the courts
risk stretching current definitions of ER 404(b) to the detriment of
defendants in non-domestic violence cases where the policy concerns
may not be the same. Second, an express evidence rule that recognizes
the probative nature of prior domestic violence would use judicial
resources more efficiently than the current system. Finally, without an
express provision allowing evidence of prior domestic violence, the
potential exists for inconsistent decisions both at the trial- and appellate-
court levels.
1. A New Domestic Violence Evidence Rule Will Avoid Distortion of
Current ER 404(b) Definitions
A new rule permitting admission of evidence of prior domestic
violence will prevent Washington courts from further distorting the
current categorical exceptions of ER 404(b). Public policy pressure on
the judicial system to respond to domestic violence offenses232 has
227. See supra Part I.B.2.
228. See Lansverk, supra note 92, at 1227.
229. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 390-91.
230. See, e.g., Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at i.
231. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
232. See Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 17.
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prompted courts to search for ways to admit prior acts of domestic
violence. This has led courts to stretch current ER 404(b) exceptions,
thereby warping the definitions of these exceptions for other crimes.3
When similar pressure was exerted on the excited-utterance hearsay
exception in the context of child abuse cases, the legislature carved out a
separate evidence rule to admit reliable child hearsay and ensure the
integrity of the remaining evidentiary rules."4
Washington courts' distortion of the current law to admit evidence of
prior domestic violence is demonstrated in two areas. First, definition
distortion has already occurred in domestic violence cases with the use of
the res gestae exception. In State v. Powell, the Supreme Court of
Washington confined evidence admitted under res gestae to happenings
within the immediate time or place of the charged offense, 5 but lower
courts have since extended this exception to include evidence of prior
domestic violence within six months of the crime.3 Second, the court of
appeals has created a non-enumerated ER 404(b) exception for admitting
evidence of prior domestic violence. In State v. Grant, the court of
appeals established an exception to admit evidence of prior misconduct
for the purpose of assessing the victim's credibility. 7 Since Grant, this
exception has been extended to permit such evidence even when the
defendant does not raise the issue of the victim's credibility" or when
the victim testifies that the charged incidents did not occur?3 9 Because
the application of ER 404(b) is not limited to domestic violence cases,2'
these generic exceptions may allow prosecutors to admit evidence of
prior misconduct any time a victim's credibility needs bolstering. A
separate rule allowing evidence of prior domestic violence would
accomplish the goal of admitting probative domestic violence evidence
233. Cf Karp, supra note 166, at 35 (describing stretching of Fed. 1. Evid. 404(b) prior to
enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 413-415).
234. See Part III.B.
235. State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 263, 893 P.2d 615, 626 (1995) (restricting res gestae
evidence to two days).
236. See, eg., State v. Mills, No. 41992-7-1, 1999 WL 294102, at *1-*2 (Wash. Ct. App. May 10,
1999) (upholding admission of res gestae events occurring within last six months of relationship),
review denied, 139 Wash. 2d 1009, 994 P.2d 846.
237. See id at 106, 920 P.2d at 613.
238. See State v. Bernal, No. 41022-9-1, 1999 WL 10094, at *1, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 11,
1999).
239. See State v. Woods, No. 42197-2-1, 1999 WL 307246, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 17, 1999).
240. See Wash. K. Evid. 404(b).
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without warping the existing ER 404(b) exceptions or establishing
generic exceptions that will impact admissibility of prior bad acts outside
the domestic violence context.
2. A New Domestic Violence Evidence Rule Will Increase Judicial
Efficiency
By acknowledging the probative value and relevance of evidence
showing prior domestic abuse, courts will also increase their
efficiency.24 A clear exception, recognizing the probative value of prior
domestic violence, will eliminate two of the four steps currently
necessary for a judge to evaluate the admission of prior bad acts.
Specifically, the trial court will no longer need to identify the purpose of
the evidence nor determine whether the evidence is relevant to the
charged offense.242 This will increase the efficiency of motions in limine
and enable judges to concentrate solely on whether the evidence meets
the requirements of ER 403 and is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.243 In addition, as opposed to the current practice of allowing
prior assaults into evidence only as rebuttal testimony, a domestic
violence exception will enable a prosecutor to weave this evidence into
its case in chief thereby creating a coherent theme for the jury to
follow.2"
3. A New Domestic Violence Evidence Rule Will Prevent Inconsistent
Decisions
A specific domestic violence exception would help limit inconsistent
results in the admission of prior bad acts evidence at the trial court level.
According to Washington state prosecutors, trial courts vary in their
approaches to admitting prior acts of domestic violence.245 This variance
may be due to judges' unfamiliarity with domestic violence dynamics,246
241. See Sheft, supra note 209, at 71 (recognizing that enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 413 conserves
both judicial and prosecutorial resources).
242. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
244. See Raeder, supra note 190, at 1494-95.
245. See interview with Cathy Shaffer, supra note 191; interview with Kristin Chandler and Jim
Ferrell, supra note 196.
246. See Raeder, supra note 190, at 1494 (reasoning that judges who do not comprehend domestic
violence dynamics view prior beatings as extremely prejudicial and not relevant to current charge).
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their concern about being overruled,247 or their degree of comfort with
the prosecutor's experience level.248 Trends among the lower courts'
evidentiary rulings, however, remain almost impossible to track because
most evidentiary rulings are not appealable by the prosecution.249
Without a specific rule governing admission of past domestic
violence, the inconsistency at the trial-court level could easily spread to
the appellate courts. For instance, given the abuse-of-discretion standard
of review for evidentiary rulings,"0 an appellate court could uphold one
trial court's admission and another's suppression of evidence in similar
fact scenarios. A specific domestic violence exception could prevent this
problem by providing a baseline for determining the probative value of
prior bad acts in domestic violence cases. Inconsistency in judicial
results, whether at the trial or appellate level, perpetuates the problem of
domestic violence by hiding the recurrent nature of abuse"' and
reinforcing a batterer's belief that he can get away with prior assaults.
C. Admitting Prior Acts ofDomestic Violence Will Help Deter Future
Abuse
An evidence rule specifically authorizing admission of prior domestic
abuse will help deter future abusive behavior. In order to stop the cycle
of domestic violence, batterers must experience negative repercussions
as a result of their actions and undergo specialized counseling concerning
their violent behavior."2 The realization by batterers that prior acts of
abuse can be used against them in future cases can help provide a needed
incentive for batterers to seek treatment. In addition, a rule allowing a
victim to testify about her past experiences may encourage more victims
to report incidents of domestic violence. 3 Finally, without an evidence
rule admitting prior domestic abuse, the "law denies reality... and asks
247. See interview with Kristin Chandler & Jim Ferrell, supra note 196 (explaining that trial court
judges are reluctant to allow prior acts into evidence because of tremendous fear of being
overturned); telephone interview with Jim Seneseu, supra note 200.
248. See interview with Cathy Shaffer, supra note 191 (stating that judges are more likely to
admit prior acts of domestic violence if experienced prosecutor is arguing motion).
249. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.10.010 (1998); Raeder, supra note 190, at 1494.
250. See State v. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244,258, 893 P.2d 615, 624 (1995).
251. See Raeder, supra note 190, at 1494.
252. See Crites & Coker, supra note 38, at 12.
253. Cf Baggish & Frey, supra note 50, at 57 (describing emotional harm victim suffered due to
her credibility being attacked on witness stand).
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the jury to do the same." 4 A Washington domestic violence task force
found that the law's failure to address domestic violence "directly and
appropriately" fosters continued abuse.255 Washington can correct this
failure by authorizing the admissibility of evidence of prior domestic
violence against both current and past victims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every day, countless Washington women are physically abused by
their intimate partners, yet this state's judicial system continues to ignore
their plight by creating hurdles for prosecutors attempting to convict
batterers. The current evidentiary rules enable batterers to avoid
conviction or meaningful punishment by silencing current and past
victims from testifying about prior abuse. The Supreme Court of
Washington should create a new evidence rule to admit evidence of prior
domestic violence against either current or past intimate partners for the
purposes of showing the defendant's propensity to abuse. Until this
happens, batterers-like Roger-will continue to beat their intimate
partners without consequence.
254. Id. at 59.
255. Washington Final Report, supra note 21, at 2.
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